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ABSTRACT
As the population of the MENA regionrises, virtual water import is increasing—evident bystriking food
import figures in many of the region’s countries. This is not a new development, it has long been the case
that MENA countries have used the import of high water content agricultural commodities as a
mechanism for covering domestic food consumption via external water. This said, as climate induced
global water scarcity and population driven global water demand increase simultaneously, the MENA
region’s practice of importing water via agricultural commodities should gain increasing attention. The
research herein quantitatively assesses MENA nations’ virtual water import determinants.Virtual water
import stands as a function of changing regional variables including: population and economic growth, as
well as strain on domestic water resources. While virtual water import from food commodities has
sustained the MENA for decades, it cannot be assumed that the region will always remain a beneficiary of
global water trade. Consequently, the region represents the geographic starting point for the global
discussion on the sustainability of virtual water trade practices in the changing world.
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I. Introduction

MENA countries constitute the world’s most water scarce geographical area (World Bank, 2008).
These countries face a resource conundrum population growth will only make more disconcerting as it is
estimated that by 2050per capita water availability in the region will reduce by half (Ibid). This situation
obligates the MENA region to import many agricultural commodities—particularly those which require
large amounts of water to produce—so as not to exhaust domestic water resources. Water scarcity forces
countries to import water through the import of high water content agricultural products which are
difficult to grow domestically due to strain on local water resources. This reality is evident by the fact that
the MENA region imports 50 percent of its grain (World Bank, 2008). The technical term for this
practice of importing/exporting high water content agricultural goods is referred to as “virtual water
trade” (Hoekstra and Hung, 2002).
While virtual water import in the MENA region has been both a wise and necessary practice for
many years, changing global water dynamics highlight the importance of assessing the practice through a
modern lens.The research herein assesses virtual water consumption in the MENA region in relation to
the variables: population, income, foreign reserves, and water use—postulating that a correlation exists
between each of these variables and virtual water import.
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Statement of the Problem

The future of mankind’s relationship with water carries reason for concern. It is predicted that
global climate change will decrease rainfall between 20 and 40 percent (World Bank, 2008) in upcoming
years, while global agricultural water consumption will rise by 19 percent before 2050 (UNESCO, 2012).
These external water circumstances, coupled with the region’s robust population growth—and consequent
rising water demand—highlight the necessity of assessing virtual water consumption (both domestic and
imported) in the MENA region.
By and large, the focus of conversation regarding water scarcity in the MENA centers on the
region’s minimal renewable water resources and the increasing strain these resources face each passing
decade. The necessary consequent of this situation—the import of virtual water—is without question an
indispensable practice. This being said, it is a practice with considerations to bear in mind. As the
populations of countries in the MENA region rise, income and consumption capabilities increase, and the
scarce domestic water supplies face further strain—one would expect dependency on virtual water import
to intensify. This dependency is in essence the problem as it carries with it two negative externalities tied
closely together: reduced food security and fiscal burden.
Food Security
The obstacle virtual water import presents to food security is straightforward: if a nation does not
control the means of production for the food it consumes, inherently there is risk. While globalization has
produced a world where every nation relies upon some other country for the production of at least one
important commodity it consumes, rarely are such commodities as essential as food. What more, as has
been mentioned, global water demand is rising while climate change is reducing rainfall, implying two
critical points:

3
1) MENA countries will become increasingly unable to use their own water to grow the food they
consume.
2) The food commodities MENA countries rely on from abroad will be grown with ever increasing
difficulty as competition to consume them increases.
Fiscal Burden
The link between virtual water import dependency and fiscal burden centers on the price
fluctuating global food market. It is widely understood that food import dependency causes countries
susceptibility to the price hikes and the economic volatility of the global food market (World Bank,
2008). A country’s ability to import food rests on the strength of its economy. As a nation’s economy
struggles, so does its ability to buy food imports. In a country like Egypt currently struggling substantially
to maintain its dwindling foreign reserves, a large grocery list of annual imports complicates the matter in
two distinct ways. First, the purchase of large amounts of food imports can drain vital fiscal reserves
(James, 2013). Secondly, a high need for virtual water import leads to a country’s dependency on the
price fluctuating global food market (James, 2013). For countries developing economically, as many are
in the MENA region, being locked in to prices on such a market is not ideal. Seeing as how global food
imports for the MENA region at large totaled 28 billion USD as recently as 2006 (IFAD, 2009), it is fair
to already characterize the region as ‘locked in’ to foreign food exports.
MENA countries cannot change their limited natural water resources. This being said, it cannot
be assumed that the MENA region will always be able to import virtual water as easily as is currently the
case. Nations must begin to consider ways in which they can reduce the water consumption demand of
their societies. Discussing the significance of this issue as a global matter, the Stockholm International
Water Institute notes that it is “essential that efforts are launched to keep the demand for water intensive
food items within reasonable limits” (Ibid, 2005, 3). The proposed research attempts to provide a detailed
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assessment of virtual water import for the benefit of future policy decisions by MENA region
governments.
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II. Literature Review

The focus of this research is twofold: 1) to estimate virtual water import in the MENA region via
the established methodology of matching water content estimations with import data for specific food
commodities, and 2) to regress various forces of change in the MENA region against these virtual water
import estimates to both assess and forecast the direction of water and food security in the region.
The Virtual Water Crisis Specific to the MENA Region
The water crisis situation in the MENA region is uncompromising as most countries are not in
any position to attempt to reduce their virtual water import. Reducing virtual water import, assuming food
demand remains unchanged, necessitates that the missing water be met via internal water resources. In the
dry MENA region this isn’t feasible as the scarce water conditions are the initial reason virtual water
import occurs so heavily to begin with. What more, it’s worth noting that in the MENA region 85 percent
of all water use is already designated to agriculture (World Bank, 2008). In other words, use of the
region’s strained water resources is already directed primarily to the area of concern—food production—
and yet virtual water import dependency remains high. Dependency on virtual water import and resiliency
from it both come at a cost.
Saying that the water resources in the MENA region are strained holds posits the following 1) the
resources are extremely limited to begin with in relation to the amount of people they are expected to
serve and 2) the resources are being drawn from faster than they can be replenished, if they can even be
replenished at all. Across the region the statistics are worrying, here are some highlights:
•

Satellite images reveal that from 2003-2009 river basins for the Tigris and Euphrates stretching
into parts of Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Iran lost 144 cubic kilometers of water—a quantity comparable
in size to the volume of the Dead Sea (James, 2013).
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•

Sana’a is predicted to become the first capital city in the world that will lack a “viable” water
supply (James, 2013).

•

Available renewable water resources per capita in the Arab world are the lowest globally
(Barghouti, 2010, 2). Moreover, by 2015 it is predicted that annual available renewable water per
capita will drop to 500 cubic meters, less than a tenth of the predicted global average of 6,000
cubic meters (AFED, 2010, vii).

•

Climate change is predicted to drastically reduce rainfall in the Arab region—25 percent—by the
end of the 21st century, a phenomenon that is projected to reduce rain-fed agricultural yields by
20 percent during the same period (AFED, 2010, vii).

•

In the Arab world, increased water extraction via energized pumping from deep, underground
water reserves has depleted non-renewable water tables leaving them permanently dry
(Barghouti, 2010, 10)

Virtual Water Import: Desirable Goal or Risky Practice?
In light of this severe water scarcity crisis in the region, the question must be asked: Is the import
of virtual water a good or bad practice? This is an important question with a nuanced answer.
Interestingly when Tony Allan first formalized the phrase and concept of virtual water, he had in mind the
water scarce MENA region and how the practice of virtual water import sustains its countries. Egypt, as
an example, only has enough water to support the needs—food consumption included—of 50 million
people (Allan, 246, 2011). With a rising population that moves further away from 50 million each year,
Egypt’s increasing virtual water import is essential to the survival of the nation. Its significance should be
acknowledged and appreciated, and to this extent, can be termed “good”. This being said, it cannot be
forgotten what a nation’s virtual water import reveals: how much water from foreign sources a nation
consumes. ‘Consume’ is not a figure of speech; the water and the food which derive from it are one in the
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same. Virtual water import thus measures food dependency; a nation’s reliance on foreign water resources
to eat each day. One can quickly conceive the risk associated with virtual water import.
Given that virtual water import is essential in the MENA region and cannot be reduced without
serious implications on the overall accessibility to sustenance for the region’s countries, the distinction
needs to be made between reducing virtual water demand and reducing virtual water import. This research
speculates that it is within the best interest of countries in the MENA region to actively and intentionally
reduce virtual water demand, not virtual water import. A reduction in virtual water demand should in turn
reduce virtual water import (on a per capita basis) but the latter is not to be pursued intentionally without
consideration of the former. If per capita virtual water demand of MENA region inhabitants reduces, this
should translate into trade practices that result in lower per capita virtual water import.
History of theVirtual Water Concept
The theory of virtual water originated in 1998 with the research of British Professor John
Anthony Allan. In 2008 Professor Allan was awarded the prestigious Stockholm Water Prize for his
development of the concept (Reuters, 2008). Arguably Allan’s most notorious work on the subject
is:Virtual Water: Tackling the Threat to Our Planet’s Most Precious Resource. In the text Allan
addresses a variety of fundamental issues pertaining to the factors which dictate virtual water
consumption and the overall significance of the subject. The book attempts to conceptually portrait how
virtual water is consumed, how this consumption can be altered, and why it matters. Allan’s focus in the
text trends towards inciting concern rather than technical explanation of how virtual water calculations are
achieved. Allan points out in the opening pages of the book that a typical English breakfast contains
roughly 1100 liters of water—a degree of consumption clearly beyond the means of most humans in the
world today (Ibid, 1). Allan’s point is clear: virtual water is being consumed in massive quantities, in
ways people don’t realize, and it is not sustainable. While Allan addresses the issue of virtual water with
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calculated concern, his tone remains optimistic. In the later chapters of the text his focus moves towards
the means by which can directly dictate the consumption of virtual water.
Since virtual water’s conceptual development fourteen years ago, various researchers have
contributed with Allan in the development of its methodology, application, and policy relevance. The
water footprint paradigm, as a contemporary method for more comprehensively evaluating water
consumption, argues that national water use is only one part of the greater consumption equation. Under
the water footprint model, water consumption is measured both internally and externally. Internal water
consumption is national water use less domestic water export. External water consumption measures the
amount of water consumed by a nation via its import of water—predominately virtual water via
agricultural commodities (Chapagain and Hoekstra, 2007, 144).
Nutrition and Virtual Water
It goes without saying the essential reason virtual water matters is because of food and the human
sustenance at stack. The threat of a world with less rain and more people is not a lack of drinking water,
it’s a lack of breakfast, lunch, and dinner for people of certain income groups in specific regions of the
world—one of which is the MENA. Nutrition is a vital component to the sustained development of any
country. In the case of MENA countries relying heavily on food imports, the nutrition of citizens is
directly tied to trade policy. Countries in the MENA region have long been able to rely on trade relations
to sustain the nutrition of citizens.
One of the interesting topics in the nutrition discussion regarding virtual water import is that of
meat. Among food consumption categories, meat leads all others in its virtual water impact: “the meat
non-vegetarians eat is the biggest single source of water consumption in their life” (Allan, 2011, 1). The
amount of virtual water in one kilogram of most meat products consistently hovers around 4,000-6,000
liters (Ibid, appendix). Beef however is the highly impactful outlier with a virtual water content of 15,500
liters per kilogram (Ibid). In light of these numbers, and a growing global population with increasing
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desire and capacity to consume animal products as part of its diet, the UN has begun to take increasing
alarm. In June 2010 the United Nation’s Environment Programme formed an international panel to
address food sustainability issues, among the important statements released by the group was the
following:
"Impacts from agriculture are expected to increase substantially due to population growth
increasing consumption of animal products. Unlike fossil fuels, it is difficult to look for
alternatives: people have to eat. A substantial reduction of impacts would only be possible with a
substantial worldwide diet change, away from animal products.”
(via Carus, 2010)
While animal products do by and large provide an important source of protein, water minded
nutritionists note that there are other ways to supplement protein in a diet. As the concern over how
increasing global consumption of meat will affect global water reserves, simultaneously there is a health
movement in the West to reduce meat consumption in diets, not for the sake of water, but rather health. In
other words, the water conservation movement to restrict meat consumption in diets has an ally in a
developing nutritional trend that argues the protein from animal and dairy products can be supplemented
by plant products which are far better for overall health.
Virtual Water Accounting
Speaking on general terms, the established methodology for virtual water accounting is to
multiple export/import trade data for a specified category of goods over a defined length of time—usually
a year—against the water content estimations for all the goods in the category. Virtual water accounting is
a developing pursuit in academia, marked by research of highly variant depth. This is to say virtual water
accounting can be as simple or complex as one chooses to make it. The process, not surprisingly, becomes
much more complicated based on the product specificity desired among the researchers. Bearing in mind
the sub-crop processing that most agricultural goods undergo prior to export, the process of virtual
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accounting becomes exponentially more complicated. Researchers attempt to incorporate the minute
details of these processes into their water estimates via formulas that distribute the total water content of
the original crop product over the various sub-products based on their value fraction of the whole
(Chapagain and Hoekstra, 2007, 145).
Presumably, the most definitive source on virtual water accounting is The Water Footprint
Assessment Manual (Hoekstra et al., 2011). The manual details the scope of traditional virtual water
accounting, what products and processes are measured, as well as the contextual circumstances that create
country by country variance in the accounting process (Ibid). The last comprehensive assessment of
virtual water import/export for all MENA countries was produced by leading virtual water experts
Mekkonen and Hoekstra (2010) using observation data spanning the period 1996-2005. It was part of a
global assessment that produced water calculations for all countries in the world in an attempt to quantify
global water trade. Other individual country assessments have been completed on select countries of
pertinence to this research such as: The Water Footprints of Morocco and the Netherlands: Global water
use as a result of domestic consumption of agricultural commodities (Hoekstra and Chapagain, 2007).
Water Institutions and Governance
Governance is at the root of the water crisis in the MENA region—both in terms of real domestic
water and virtual water import. 60 percent of the surface water in the Arab world originates from beyond
the region’s borders (Dayem and Odeh, 2010, 172). Consequently, the ability of governments to form
competent institutions to negotiate the sustained flow of this water to the region is crucial. The overall
success of water relations between the MENA region and its neighbors depends greatly on good
governance practices such that the best interests of the region are properly represented and diplomatically
pursued.
The most notorious example of this in the region is likely Egypt and its relationship with the 9
other Nile riparian states. Egypt’s success or failure in water politics with these countries is linked closely
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to the internal organization and competency of the country’s water diplomacy representatives.
Additionally, in terms of best using the region’s water after it arrives, governance again is crucial. Rapid
population growth has placed strain on water institutions in the region and deteriorated their overall
effectiveness in water management (Dayem and Odeh, 2010, 172). So long as weak governance breeds
poor water management, countries will remain trapped importing more virtual water than should be the
case. There are several types of problems facing the MENA region regarding water governance, however
two stand out as particularly relevant: poor coordination and a failure to properly implement water
regulations. Regarding coordination Arab countries tend to delegate water management among multiple
ministries, tasks are frequently duplicated and the process inefficient on the whole (Majzoub, 2010, 144).
The regulatory framework is equally problematic; laws tend to be fragmented, easily ignored by defiant
farmers, and very often trumped by other forms of legality such as nepotism and tribalism (Ibid).
In the MENA region, the poor are the sector of the population most burdened by this domestic
water mismanagement as they “bear the disproportionate share of the impact of inefficient water and
sanitation services” (Barghouti, 2010, 5). They are less often connected to piped water supplies, often
share water installation services, and pay more (relatively speaking) for water access than those in the
socio-economic classes above them (Ibid). Similarly the poor are the sector of the population most likely
to bear the weight of the negative externalities associated with rising virtual water import as the price
fluctuations of the global food market affect them most severely. Additionally, as food security threats
rise with the increase in virtual water import, the poor are the sector of the population most likely to be hit
the hardest in the event a crisis arises.
The Effect of Population and Income
Contemporary literature focuses on two variables in particular as being especially responsible for
rising virtual water consumption: population and income. Virtual water consumption—a term closely
correlated with virtual water import in water scarce regions of the world—is very obviously affected by
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population growth (how many people must eat) and personal income (how much money people have to
eat).
The extent of correlation between population growth and domestic water withdrawal is useful
when making predictions as to population’s effect on virtual water import. In the MENA region, from
1985 to 2000, water withdrawal from domestic sources rose 50 percent as population growth rose 40
percent (Barghouti, 4, 2010). This 5-4 ratio puts into context how draining population growth is on
MENA countries’ water resources and gives basis for the concern that as domestic water dwindles, the
only alternative is for virtual water import to rise.
Although a nation’s population growth inevitably leads to greater overall virtual water
consumption, it should be remembered that this consumption is met by both internal and external water
sources. This is to say, population is a variable truly independent from virtual water consumption, or in
the specific case of this research, virtual water import. If a nation’s internal water use becomes more
productive (i.e. a more favorable drop per crop ratio is achieved) and the nation chooses to cover its
increased virtual water consumption with these greater crop yields, virtual water import will not increase,
despite population growth. If internal water efficiency and crop production capacity increase at a rate
exceeding population growth, it can be the case that virtual water import actually declines even as more
people consume virtual water.
Likewise with rising incomes, the effect on virtual water consumption is more dynamic than one
might initially assume. While it is true that increased income corresponds to increased food consumption
capacity, a higher income likewise augments individuals’ ability to conscientiously consume low water
content foods, if and when policies encourage them to do so. Additionally, the issue of what types of
foods people want to consume as they become more wealthy is a crucial issue at play in regards to virtual
water. While UNEP notes that changing food consumption habits among the world’s rising middle-class
have increased the amount of people eating high water content meat products (Carus, 2010), it is not
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always the case that the more expensive food commodities have higher water contents. In countries such
as the United States, fruits and vegetables which comprise the low water content vegan diet are sold at
high prices often beyond the purchasing range of the poor (Kenner, 2008). Thus it becomes clear that a
person’s rising income does not in and of itself determine whether or not a person will consume more or
less water via the foods he or she eats. A rising income provides individuals the ability to either reduce or
increase their virtual water consumption based on their ultimate decisions as consumers.
Virtual Water in the Policy Sphere
While reputable international development organizations like the World Bank and FAO, as well
as individual governments, provide comprehensive facts like available water supply and consumption by
sector—they do so only in regards to domestic water resources. Virtual water research remains a highly
‘ivory tower’ pursuit, with little practice among the organizations most likely to produce policy relevant
data. This will need to change for virtual water to become practically relevant on an international scale. In
water scarce regions like the MENA, food security and water conservation are directly connected in the
policy sphere. Successful policy measures for both begin with proper, comprehensive data collection
practices. In the paper: “Let it Reign: The New Water Paradigm for Global Food Security” it is noted that
“assessments of national virtual water balances (import/export) are a key component of future food and
nutritional security” (Stockholm International Water Institute, 2005, 4). As global water scarcity increases
and water consumption accounting takes on increasing significance, there clearly is rationale for including
virtual water import/export figures into the overall quantitative picture of water consumption at large.
This is particularly the case in countries like Egypt where food imports of crops like wheat constitute an
enormous portion of overall water consumption. In such instances, measuring water associated with only
the domestically grown commodities paints only half the picture.
Public Dietary Preferences
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An analysis of virtual water’s significance in the policy sphere reveals two primary access points:
public dietary preferences and agricultural practices—particularly irrigation.Reducing a society’s
consumption of high water content foods without sacrificing nutrition via policy is a complicated matter.
Radical but necessary reforms often seem impossible initially, particularly when they intrude on personal
autonomy. Changing society’s diet in a way that reduces water consumption walks the line in this regard.
It’s hard to imagine governments in the MENA region mandating that citizens limit their per capita
consumption of high water content food like meat. Very easily one can imagine the difficulties which
would likely arise from such an action in terms of public discontent and the logistics of enforcement.
Nonetheless, as the global significance of the relationship between diet and virtual water consumption
rises, enforcement of diet related policies may become easier. This will be increasingly true if
organizations like the United Nations continue to stress on a global scale the notion that a dietary shift
away from meat and dairy products is crucial to the prevention of future starvation (Carus, 2010). Some
of the effective diet oriented practices governments can embark on to minimize citizens’ virtual water
consumption include the following:
•

Foods can be analyzed in terms of their overall nutritional value relative to their water
content, and based on these calculations governments can promote consumption of
certain foods over others (Stockholm International Water Institute, 2005, 4).

•

Nutrition information on packaged food products can include water content data,
including water/nutrient ratios (Ibid, 5).

•

Institute market based incentives, such as subsidies, for the production and consumption
of low water content/high nutritional food products (Ibid, 5).

Agricultural Practices
It is imperative that MENA countries pursue more water efficient agricultural practices, despite
the technological and financial challenges. More efficient domestic water use allows a country to increase
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the proportion of its agricultural yield relative to the water used. In short, the same amount of water can
yield more crops, in turn reducing food import demand and virtual water import dependency.
The water efficiency of existing agricultural practices in the Middle East is a matter of debate.
Egypt, the world’s largest importer of wheat, exemplifies how a country can simultaneously excel and fail
in terms of efficiently using its water resources. Facing extreme limitations in regards to water supply and
technological capacity, Egyptian farmers are relatively thrifty: “the Egyptian farmer is a bastion of watermanagement virtue, producing two crops and simultaneously achieving levels of livestock management
similar to the average northern European farmer” (Allan, 2011, 253). It can thus be said MENA farmers
in countries such as Egypt exhibit relative efficiency provided the austere conditions under which they
operate. Nonetheless, this is not to say that room for agricultural water use improvement does not exist,
quite the contrary.
At Egypt’s High Dam more water is lost to evaporation without agricultural yield than any other
location in the world. Roughly 13 cubic kilometers of evaporated water evaporate from the dam’s
reservoir each year, constituting 15 percent of the Nile’s average annual flow and enough water to meet
the water consumption needs of ten million people (Ibid, 250). This lost water is certainly one area among
several contributing to the total unfulfilled potential of water use in Egypt. The extent to which more
efficient water management practices can lead to higher agricultural productivity—increased ‘crop per
drop’ yields—may be as high as 50% in volume (Allan, 2010, 5). Unfulfilled water potential does not
plague Egypt alone. Throughout the MENA region deficiencies exist in agricultural water management
manifesting themselves in a variety of ways such as ineffective spending on water efficient technology,
poor institutional frameworks for water management, weak water governance practices, and a lack of
trained water management professionals in the sector at large (Abou-Hadid, 2010, 56).
Improving water use efficiency in the MENA region is a double-edged sword. Water saving
technological improvements in developing MENA countries are often cost prohibitive unless supported
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by investment (Black and King, 2009, 13); what more, as water becomes more scarce and difficult to
access, the cost of these technologically based efficiency upgrades rises. While financial obstacles remain
a formidable barrier to more efficient water management practices in the MENA region, the long-term
benefit of investment in better practices is invaluable given the severity of the current water scarcity
situation. Improving water efficiency in the agricultural sector can be achieved through focus on three
broad categories: capacity building, institutional reform, and policy initiatives/fiscal measures.
Capacity Building:
•

Investment in small-scale irrigation technology for farmers not connected to larger irrigation
grids/projects (Black and King, 2009, 13).

•

Support the capacity of farmers to engage in rainwater harvesting via the provision of capital and
knowledge (Ibid).

•

Strengthen the agricultural sector’s water infrastructure—particularly in regards to retrieval,
transport and reuse of wastewater—in a manner that maximizes water use dividends (Stockholm
International Water Institute, 2005, 4). Water transport can be developed in such a way that
irrigation supply better matches the water demand of crops and agricultural drainage water is
reused more efficiently.

Institutional Reform
•

Strengthen the management, coordination, transparency, accountability, and over-all
technological know-how of the water governance authorities in the MENA region (Abou-Hadid,
2010, 58).

Policy Initiatives/Fiscal Measures
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•

Investigate how current agricultural subsidies relate to water use efficiency (Stockholm
International Water Institute, 2005, 5). Based on this knowledge governments should pursue
“rebates, reduced taxes, targeted subsidies, price signals, and other economic incentives” (AbouHadid, 2010, 57) that seek to shape the supply side of the agricultural market in such a way that
minimizes water usage. Along these lines, governments should reevaluate current policies that
seek to meet growing food demand by subsidizing the use of water in the agricultural sector, an
action that has the backlash effect of distorting the supply/demand market as irrigation water is
distributed “at well below the cost of service provision” (Ibid, 56).

•

Promote water sharing networks and coordination within the private agricultural sector to
maximize the dividends of national water use (Stockholm International Water Institute, 2005, 5).
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III. Data Description

The researcher uses panel data for 18 countries covering a total of 5 years: (2000 and 2008-2011),
collected from a variety of sources. In the case of the independent variables, data comes from the World
Bank and Food and Agriculture Organization’s AQUASTAT database. Data for the dependent variable
virtual water import is gathered using trade data from the International Trade Center and water content
figures from the FAO.
Defining the MENA Region
Based on World Bank (2011) classifications, the researcher includes the following 18 countries as
constituting the MENA Region: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen. Although
officially part of the MENA region, Palestine isexcluded from the panel data due to limitations in tracking
its trade figures such as to make meaningful virtual water estimates.
Variable Descriptions
Virtual Water Import (Dependent variable)
The dependent variable: virtual water import is operationalized by calculating its value for the
respective MENA countries over 5 years: 2008-2011, as well as 2000. This process is done via
multiplying trade data from the International Trade Centre with water content figures from the FAO. The
data collected for 2008-2011 is original primary data produced via this method while the data gathered
from 2000 is retrieved data from leading virtual water experts Hoekstra and Mekonnen (2011)—
themselves using the same methodology. The researcher picks data from 2000, as well as 2008-2011
based on data availability. The researcher acknowledges an 8 eight year gap (2000 to 2008) is not
standard, however in the case of this research and the limited time-frame given, remains the best option
for increasing the number of observations.
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For the collection of the trade data, the researcher uses a data program called: Trade Map.This
International Trade Center data program provides import/export figures regarding the trade of agricultural
commodities—both crop and animal. Trade map allows for product classification on a six-digit level.
Every two digits in the six digit number are a code for a certain animal or crop classification. Take the
following example for a number such as 010511.
•

01-Indicates the product is a live animal

•

0105-Indicates the product is a live animal and the animal category is fowl

•

010511-Indicates the product is a live animal, in the fowl category, weighing more than 185
grams.

(ITC Trade Map, 2012)

The proposed thesis divides agricultural imports into two categories: crop and animal. Based on
the availability of trade data, the research tracks the import of the following 17 crops which constitute
roughly 68 percent of total crop water use: wheat, rice, maize, soy beans, sugar cane, seed cotton, barley,
sorghum, palm oil, coconuts, millet, coffee, cassava, groundnuts, potatoes, rapeseed, and natural rubber
(Hoekstra and Mekonnen No. 47, 2010, 13) Modeling previous virtual water research, the animal
products evaluated are broken into eight broad categories: beef cattle, dairy cows, swine, sheep, goats,
fowls/poultry, laying hens, and horses (Chapagain and Hoekstra, 2007). Thechart below lists the crop and
animal commodities chosen. For the 17 crop products, water footprint percentages are given to provide a
sense for their virtual water significance.
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Crop Products (17)

Wheat

Percentage of Total
Water Footprint of
Crop Water
Production
15

Animal Products (5)

Rice

13

Swine

Maize

10

Sheep

Soya beans

5

Goats

Sugar cane

4

Fowls/poultry

Seed cotton

3

Barley

3

Sorghum

2

Oil palm

2

Coconuts

2

Millet

2

Coffee

2

Groundnuts

1

Natural Rubber

1

Tobacco

1

Rapeseed

1

Seed Cotton

1

Bovine

After the trade data for these agricultural products is gathered (measured in terms of quantity) it is
multiplied by water content estimates. The water content estimates for these respective 17 crop and 5
animal products come from two sources: The Green, Blue, and Grey Water Footprint of Crops and
Derived Crop Products as well as The Green, Blue, and Grey Water Footprint of Farm Animals and
Animal Products (Hoekstra and Mekkonen, 2010). Take the following as an example of this process. In
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2010 Bahrain imported 67,337 tons of rice. Given that the global estimate for the amount of water
required to produce one ton of rice is 1146 cubic meters, the following yields the amount of virtual water
imported by Bahrain through its import of rice:

67, 337 tons of rice at 1146 cubic meters/ton = 77,168,202 cubic meters of virtual water
The virtual water estimates conducted in this research (2008-2011) are original figures. They are
produced by replicating the standard paradigm for calculating the virtual water of agricultural products:
multiple the product’s water content (cubic meters per ton) by the quantity of the good traded (tons).
The 17 agricultural products selected are chosen based on their high water content levels. They
represent 68 percent of the total water footprint of crop production (Hoekstra and Mekonnen, 2010, 13).
Thus, after calculating virtual water import for these 17 crop products, the figures were divided by .68 to
give estimates for total virtual water import. Put simply, the 17 crops chosen only constitute 68 percent of
the possible virtual water import a country could feasibly have. The remaining 32 percent of crops
capable of affecting a country’s overall virtual water import could have been tracked, but are not in this
thesis due to their large number and small individual contributions to virtual water at large. In other
words, while 17 crops constitute 68 percent of the total water footprint of crop production, far more
constitute the remaining 32 percent.The circle graph on the following page is that used for the research.
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1

(Hoeksta and Mekonnen, 2011)

One of the chief difficulties in virtual water import accounting is determining the crops which
constitute the bulk of a nation’s virtual water import. It is beyond the scope of this research (and research
far more advanced than this) to produce a perfect virtual water estimate as doing so requires accurate data
and analysis of all agricultural imports.This said, looking at what crop and animal commodities a nation
imports in large quantity is an obvious first step, bearing in mind the important point that if a
commodityimported in large quantity does not itself havea highvirtual water content, it may not actually
1

Fodder crops (9%) are not used in the researcher’s virtual water estimates for two reasons. First, trade data for
fodder crops as a category does not exist. Secondly, and most importantly, the water content of fodder crops is
included in the virtual water content of the animal commodities themselves.
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be a major source of virtual water import. Conversely, a highvirtual water content commodity imported in
smaller quantity may be crucial to virtual water import estimations, but overlooked as it does not register
as a major import. This is the danger of assuming one can accurately estimate virtual water import simply
by evaluating the 20 or 30 largest commodities imported. At the same, trying to calculate virtual water
import by looking strictly at the import of high water content foods can be problematic if the foods are
imported in such low quantity as to not substantially affect overall virtual water import. In summary, there
are two import criteria to bear in mind: the commodity’s quantity of import and the commodity’s virtual
water content.
This research evaluates the import of the crops which constitute 68% of crop water production,
recognizing the distinction that these crops do not constitute the same percentage of virtual water import.
Given this research’s attempt to estimate virtual water import for 18 different countries that import crop
and animal commodities in highly variant quantities, the researcher chose to use the ‘high water content
methodology’ for determing the commodities to evaluate. The 17 crops and 5 animal products assessed
are chosen based on their substantial water contents (outlined in the previous crop water production
graph). Additionally, the researcher’s review of the literature confirms that the essential commodities
evaluated herein correspond with the essential commodities used in published research (wheat, rice,
barley, coffee, beans, chicken, beef, goat meat, etc.)
Below is a summary chart depicting the structure of the excel data used to produce final panel
data estimates (real figures used):
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Year

Country

Crop

Water Content
(cubic
meters/ton)

Quantity
Imported
(tons)

Virtual Water
Import (cubic
meters)

2008

Egypt

Wheat

1277

4,077,543

5,207,022,411

2009

Egypt

Wheat

1277

4,059,927

5,184,526,779

2010

Egypt

Wheat

1277

9,926,578

12,676,240,106

2011

Egypt

Wheat

1277

10,516,045

13,428,989,465

2008

Egypt

Rice

1146

11,605

13,299,330

2009

Egypt

Rice

1146

16,257

18,630,522

2010

Egypt

Rice

1146

17,649

20,225,754

2011

Egypt

Rice

1146

53,238

61,010,748

Population (Independent variable):
The variable population is regressed in three different forms against virtual water import: total
population in millions, percentage growth, and first difference for each year and that before. Population
figures for the 18 respective MENA countries are calculated via the World Bank database (2013) for 2000
and 2008-2011. Population growth figures are likewise gathered from the World Bank database, while
first-difference figures are created by the researcher using Excel.
GDP (Independent variable):
GDP per capita data for the respective MENA countries listed is calculated with data from the
World Bank (2013) for the periods 2000 and 2008-2011. It is listed in current US dollars.
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Total Water Withdrawal and Renewable Water Resources Per Capita (Independent variable):

Total domestic water withdrawal is provided by the FAO’s AQUASTAT database. The
researcher uses the data filling technique: constant incremental change for missing years. Regarding
renewable water resources per capita, the data is gathered over four year intervals. The researcher thus
takes the provided figures for 2007 and 2011 and estimates the years 2008, 2009, and 2010 by assuming
constant incremental change. In the case of the year 2000, the researcher uses the closest year provided by
the FAO database, the difference never exceeding more than two years.
Total Foreign Reserves (Independent variable):
Foreign reserve data is gathered via the World Bank database (2013). It is calculated in US
dollars and includes gold.
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Final Panel Dataset
The composition of the final panel dataset produces a total of 90 observations—18 countries over
5 years. The chart below models this for 2 of the 18 countries.
Year

Virtual
Water
Import
(billions of
cubic
meters)

Population
(millions)

GDP
(billions of
USD)

FX
Reserves
(billions of
USD)

Total
Water
Withdrawal
(billions of
cubic
meters)

Algeria

2000

14.51

30.53

54.79

13.56

1.112

Algeria

2008

42.43

34.43

170.99

148.10

2.001

Algeria

2009

38.72

34.95

138.12

155.11

2.112

Algeria

2010

40.03

35.47

161.98

170.46

2.224

Algeria

2011

51.45

35.98

188.68

191.37

2.335

Bahrain

2000

1.02

0.64

7.97

1.61

0.091

Bahrain

2008

0.92

1.05

21.90

4.05

0.164

Bahrain

2009

0.72

1.17

19.32

4.01

0.173

Bahrain

2010

1.04

1.26

22.95

5.30

0.182

Bahrain

2011

0.77

1.32

26.7

4.77

0.191
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IV. Research and Data Limitations

Restriction of Crop Products in the Formulation of Virtual Water Import Calculations:
One of the biggest challenges in water footprint accounting is accurately tracking the water
content of a specific crop or animal product as it undergoes processing into sub-products. Many of the
major agricultural commodities like wheat and rice are broken down into sub-products such as wheat
starch or rice flour. These different sub-crop products almost always vary from the primary crop in their
water content—some requiring more water, others less. Often when a crop is processed into a crop
product there is a loss of weight resulting in lower water content per ton for the new crop product
(Chapagain and Hoekstra, 2007, 145), assuming no water is used in processing or additives. If however
water is used in the processing of the new crop product, or the new crop product includes high water
content additive substances, the derived product may have a water content higher than the primary crop.
In terms of virtual water accounting of crop products, the specific water content data on derived
crop products is only useful when trade data also exists for the sub-crop categories. In the event that trade
data for all MENA countries exists for a sub-crop category such as corn flour, using the specific water
content data for the sub-crop is only worthwhile if the good constitutes a meaningful portion of the
overall trade of the primary crop. As an example, MENA countries imported an aggregate 7587 tons of
wheat gluten in 2011. Wheat gluten has a water content figure twice as high as traditional wheat (2928 vs.
1277 cubic meters ton). Nonetheless, 7,587 tons of wheat gluten is still only on the margins of virtual
water significance compared to theprimary crop wheat. Wheat imports totaled 35,066,859 tons for all
MENA countries in 2011 (ITC, 2012). Wheat gluten imports constitute a quantity that is 0.00022 of
overall wheat imports, roughly one fifth of one percent. Therefore, even with its higher water content, one
can see how tracking the import of wheat gluten as a specific product category is marginal in terms of
estimating the entire virtual water import of a nation.
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Consequently, the researcher is acknowledging the limitation of not be able to specifically
incorporate all derived crop-products in his research. Of the 17 crop products examined in the research,
13 have notable sub-crop products with different virtual water contents. Of these 13, the specific sub-crop
water content data is incorporated in the virtual water calculation for the overall crop product assuming
the following conditions are met:
•

Trade data exists for the sub-crop product for at least 14 of the 18 MENA countries
examined.

•

The sub-crop product constitutes a significant portion of the overall trade of the primary
crop—10 percent or more.

These conditions in place, the following sub-products are used in the researcher’s virtual water
calculations: wheat flour, potato flakes, refined sugar, soybean oil, and refined coconut oil.
In regards to the virtual water associated with animal products, 5 meat categories are included:
bovine, swine, poultry, sheep, and goat. These five animal categories correspond to those evaluated by
leading virtual water researchers (Chapagain and Hoekstra, 2007, 145), however it is worth noting that
these researchers also track the virtual water content of the animal categories: laying hens and horses—
data not used in this research due to unavailability. The virtual water calculations for these animal
categories examine the meat of these animals in all of its different states: fresh, chilled, and frozen.
Poultry however, is an exception as the trade database only allows the researcher to track imports of live
poultry.
Restricting Virtual Water Import Specifically to Agriculture
A nation’s virtual water consumption—real and virtual, domestic and foreign, generally occurs
under the three following sectors: agriculture, industry, and municipal. The proposed research will only
account for virtual water consumed via the agricultural sector for the following two reasons:
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1)

As a general rule, agricultural commodities account for the largest portion of a nation’s
overall water consumption (Chapagain and Hoekstra, 144, 2007).

2)

The purpose of the proposed research is to measure virtual water consumption.
Consequently, applying virtual water theory, agriculture is the sector most fit for this
type of analysis. Via water content data of food commodities and trade flow statistics,
it is possible to estimate the complete water consumption of a nation in the agricultural
sector. It is important to remember that via virtual water logic, water consumption of
nation (x) can represent itself in the agricultural sector of country (y). For industrial
water use, it is more difficult to make virtual water calculations as water content data
on products is not available to the same extent.

Restricting Virtual Water to Green Water
In the virtual water/water footprint accounting field of study, water is categorized into the
following three types: blue, green and grey. Blue refers to surface water in streams, lakes, etc.; green
refers to rainwater; and grey refers to water used to reduce agricultural pollutants to acceptable levels
(Chapagain and Hoekstra, 2007, 144). If researchers are aware of how countries use water for agriculture,
estimates can be made in regards to the amount of blue, green, grey water use. For the sake of simplicity,
this will not be attempted in the proposed research. It is assumed that virtual water refers to green water.
While this may seem counter-intuitive as the MENA region as a whole receives very little annual rainfall;
nonetheless, the renewable water resources the region does have access to (rivers, streams, groundwater,
etc.) are replenished by rainfall often beyond the MENA’s borders (i.e., the Nile basin).
Missing Data
Missing trade data used for the calculation of virtual water import is filled in by the researcher.
The researcher usesaverage interval change to fill in missing years based on years for which information
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is given. In situations where no trade data exists for any of the years, the researcher proceeds in his virtual
water estimations, ignoring the missing data. With the exception of Saudi Arabia, discussed below, there
are only three instances in which this occurs: data regarding oil palm import for Syria and Iran, poultry
import for Iran, Yemen, and Libya, and lastly data regarding seed cotton import in Libya. Concerning
missing data points for the independent variables, similarly the researcher uses the average interval
change method among the existing years to fill in missing points.
Saudi Arabia
Trade data for the country Saudi Arabia is far more limited than is the case for any of the other 17
countries—particularly for the year 2011. This in mind, the researcher removes Saudi Arabia: 2011 data
from the regression. Thus for the majority of the regression models, the number of observations is 89
rather than 90. For the remaining three years in which the researcher estimates virtual water import, Saudi
Arabia crop data is likewise less available than the other countries. The researcher speculates that Saudi
Arabia virtual water estimates for the years 2008, 2009, 2010 are lower than they should be.
Population Figures for GCC Countries
It is noted that for the following countries World Bank population figures may not be completely
accurate: Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman. As migrant worker
contingencies in these countries are large and non-nationals compose a substantial portion of gross
residency in these countries—the researcher speculates the population data used may be lower than is
factual. Nonetheless, it is clear the World Bank population figures take into account—at least to an
extent—the non-national populations of these countries. The World Bank’s population figure for Qatar
(2011) is: 1.87 million. While official figures for the number of Qatari nationals are difficult to find,
estimates generally have the Qatari national population between 200,000 and 300,000. Based on a 1970
census and a possible growth rate of 4.5% annual, the Qatari national population is predicted at 255,280
(Lockerbie, 2013). Given the World Bank’s 1.87 million figure, it is clear it takes into account the
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country’s non-national residents in its population data at least to a degree, bearing in mind limited
information and the political sensitivity of the matter.
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V. Methodology

Explanations of Models Used
Model 1: Absolutes
All variables are regressed in their absolute forms.
•

Y(it) = f (Population(it), GDP(it), Aggregate Foreign Reserves(it), Total Domestic Water
Withdrawal(it),ԑ(it))
where Y = virtual water import, i = country, and t = time

Model 2: First differences
All variables are regressed in terms of their absolute change (first differences).
•

Y(it) = f (First Difference Population(it), First Difference GDP(it), First Difference Aggregate
Foreign Reserves(it), First Difference Total Domestic Water Withdrawal(it), ԑ(it) )
where Y = virtual water import, i = country, and t = time

Model 3: Per capita measurements
All variables are regressed in their per capita forms. Population is thus removed from the equation as the
per capita forms of the remaining variables take it into account. Units on the variables change: GDP per
capita is measured in thousands of USD, foreign reserves in thousands of USD, and water withdrawal in
thousands of cubic meters.
•

Y (it) = f (GDP Per Capita(it), Foreign Reserves Per Capita(it), Domestic Water Withdrawal Per
Capita(it), ԑ(it) )
where Y = virtual water import, i = country, and t = time

Model 4: Percentage change
All variables are regressed in terms of their percentage change.
•

Y (it) = f (% Change Population(it), % Change GDP(it), % Change Aggregate Foreign
Reserves(it), % Change Total Domestic Water Withdrawal(it), ԑ(it) )
where Y = virtual water import, i = country, and t = time

Model 5: Fixed time effect
Replicating Model 1, the researcher then adds the fixed variable time effect (V).
•

Y (it) = f (Population(it), GDP(it), Aggregate Foreign Reserves(it), Total Domestic Water
Withdrawal(it), V(t), ԑ(it) )
where Y = virtual water import, i = country, and t = time
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Model 6: Fixed country effect
Replicating Model 1, the researcher then adds the fixed variable country effect (µ).
•

Y (it) = f (Population(it), GDP(it), Aggregate Foreign Reserves(it), Total Domestic Water
Withdrawal(it), µ(i), ԑ(it) )
where Y = virtual water import, i = country, and t = time

Model 7: Fixed time/country effect
Replicating Model 1, the researcher then adds both the fixed variable time (V) and country (µ) effects.
•

Y (it) = f (Population(it), GDP(it), Aggregate Foreign Reserves(it), Total Domestic Water
Withdrawal(it), V(t), µ(i), ԑ(it) )
where Y = virtual water import, i = country, and t = time

Model 8: Logs
All variables are regressed as logs in attempt to limit heteroskedasticity within the variance.
•

Log Y (it) = f (log Population(it), log GDP(it), log Aggregate Foreign Reserves(it), log Total
Domestic Water Withdrawal(it), ԑ(it) )
where Y = virtual water import, i = country, and t = time

Model 9: Log-linear
Log-linear regressions allow a researcher to see how variables measured in units can affect the percentage
change of a dependent variable, often telling more than a linear-linear regression alone when making
estimates for the future (Woolridge, 2009, 43). This in mind the researcher holds the independent
variables in their normal units while changing virtual water import to a log form.
•

Log Y (it) = f (Population(it), GDP(it), Aggregate Foreign Reserves(it), Total Domestic Water
Withdrawal(it), ԑ(it) )
where Y = virtual water import, i = country, and t = time

Model 10: Per capita (water withdrawal per capita replaced with renewable water resources per capita)
The researcher replicates the per capita structure of Model 3, however replaces water withdrawal per
capita with renewable water resources per capita in effort to better capture how already existing water
strain induces virtual water import. Population is removed from the equation to avoid multicollinearity as
its change is already taken into consideration via renewable water resources per capita. Units on the
variables stand as follows: GDP per capita is measured in thousands of USD, foreign reserves per capita
in thousands of USD, and renewable water resources per capita in cubic meters.
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•

Y (it) = f (GDP Per Capita(it), Foreign Reserves Per Capita(it), Renewable Water Resources Per
Capita(it), ԑ(it) )
where Y = virtual water import, i = country, and t = time

Model 11: Absolute model with removal of year 2000.
It is noted by the researcher’s committee that the substantial 8 year period between 2000 and 2008 may
potentially skew the predicted variable effects. This in mind, the researcher provides a model only
drawing on data from years 2008-2011.
•

Y(it) = f (Population(it), GDP(it), Aggregate Foreign Reserves(it), Total Domestic Water
Withdrawal(it),
where Y = virtual water import, i = country, and t = time
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Anticipated Variable Effects
Population:
As population rises, virtual water consumption is certain to increase as more people are
demanding food. Thus the researcher expects a positive relationship while using growth rates and first
differences to assess the specific effect of population growth on virtual water import.
GDP Per Capita:
GDP per capita data is chosen via the hypothesis that it has a positive relationship with virtual
water import. This hypothesis is formed based on the following two assumptions: 1) a rising GDP per
capita indicates higher individual purchasing power to consume increased levels of virtual water and 2) a
rising GDP per capita indicates increased ability to adopt conspicuous consumption habits, which in the
realm of food tends to mean more virtual water via products like meat.
Total Domestic Water Withdrawal:
Given the difficulty in charting renewable water resources per capita without avoiding
multicollinearity with population growth, total domestic water withdrawal is another way of speculating
how domestic water conditions affect virtual water import incentive. The researcher is not certain what
the relationship is, but speculates that greater water withdrawal from internal/domestic renewable should
decrease virtual water import demand—a negative causal relationship.
Renewable Water Resources Per Capita:
This research hypothesizes that countries do not inherently want to import food to the extent of
severe dependency—as is the case in numerous MENA countries; it is a consequence of their internal
water scarcity situations. Renewable water resources per capita thus quantifies—to some extent—nations’
degree of desperation for virtual water, or inversely, their reluctance to use domestic water to meet food
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consumption demand. This research hypothesizes a negative relationship. As a country’s renewable water
resources per capita increase, incentive to import virtual water declines.
Total Foreign Reserves:
Foreign reserves dictate a nation’s ability to purchase food imports on the international market
(James, 2013). Consequently, the hypothesized relationship between foreign reserves and virtual water
import is positive: higher levels of foreign reserves lead to increased ability to import food/virtual water.
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Table 1: Regression Model Results

Model 1
Absolutes

Model 2:
1st Diff.

Model 3
Per
Capita

Model 4
% Change

Model 5
Country
effect

Model 6
Time
effect

Model 7
Countrytime eff.

Model 8
Log

Model 9
Log-linear

Model 10
Per
Capita 2 2

Model 11
Absolutes
w/o 2000

---------

0.588

Populatio
n
(millions)

0.568

3.305

(0.000)***

(0.500)

Total FX
Reserves
(billions of
USD)

0.003

0.040

0.277

(0.783)

(0.840)

(0.385)

GDP
(billions of
USD)

0.045

0.032

0.112

(0.000)***

(0.584)

(0.115)

Total
Domestic
Water
Withdraw
al(billions
of cubic
meters)

-0.196

2.308

(0.005)***

(0.549)

Renewabl
e Water
Resources
Per
Capita
(cubic
meters)

---------

---------

Time
Effect

---------

---------

---------

---------

No

Yes

Yes

---------

---------

---------

---------

Country
Effect

---------

---------

---------

---------

Yes

No

Yes

---------

---------

---------

---------

0.000

0.437

0.084

0.790

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.058

0.000

0.673

0.076

0.078

0.034

0.843

0.682

0.845

0.876

0.540

0.084

0.679

89

51

85

53

89

89

89

50

89

89

71

---------

-3.875

1.508

0.555

1.557

1.022

0.021

(0.730)

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

-0.962

-0.027

0.003

-0.027

0.113

0.000

0.031

0.003

(0.500)

(0.050)*

(0.793)

(0.059)*

(0.002)***

(0.407)

(0.901)

(0.785)

1.696

0.057

0.040

0.061

-1.634

0.001

0.123

0.036

(0.354)

(0.000)***

(0.001)***

(0.002)***

(0.878)

(0.003)***

(0.073)*

(0.007)***

0.149

-19.780

0.027

-0.179

0.025

6.924

-0.009

---------

-0.169

(0.952)

(0.750)

(0.770)

(0.013)**

(0.794)

(0.625)

(0.005)***

---------

---------

---------

---------

---------

---------

---------

(0.000)***

(0.052)*

-0.002

---------

(0.331)

F

R2

N

*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

2

Model 10 use per capita variables identical to Model 3. Water withdrawal per capita is however replaced by
renewable water resources per capita.
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VI. Analysis of the Data

The analysis herein is composed of three parts: 1) discussion on the significance of the regression
models as well asregression based forecasting 2) correlation graphing that attempts to highlight additional
aspects of the variables’ relationship 3) general observations from the panel dataset.
The Regression Models: Significance and Forecasting:
A broad analysis of the Table 1 results shows the following frequencies of significance for the
respective variable coefficients: Population (7 of 9 models), GDP (7 of 11 models), FX reserves (3 of 11
models), Water withdrawal (4 of 10 models), Renewable water resources per capita (0 of 1 models). See
below for model specific analysis.
Model 1: Absolutes
Assessing the Accuracy:
Three variables have significance at the 0.01 level and are included to create the model:
population, GDP, and total domestic water withdrawal. The coefficient on foreign reserves does not prove
significant and is dropped; the model thus estimates the following:
Virtual Water Import = βo + β1 (Population) + β2 (GDP)+ β3 (Total Domestic Water Withdrawal)
Virtual Water Import = 1.314 + 0.568 (Population) + 0.045 (GDP) + ----0.196 (Total Domestic Water
Withdrawal)
The positive coefficients on population and GDP indicate the relationship expected. As
population (millions) and GDP (billions) rise, so to do does virtual water import. Specifically the
researcher speculates the following: population increase is indicative of higher virtual water demand,
while GDP increases virtual water import as, on a per capita basis, individuals consume more and the
nation at large has increased purchasing power. The negative coefficient on Total Domestic Water
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Withdrawal (----0.196) is interesting and certainly not obvious. This research speculates that high domestic
water withdrawal offsets the need to import virtual water. Countries cover more of their gross virtual
water demand via greater withdrawal from domestic resources, limiting virtual water import dependency.
Whether or not this is desirable depends entirely on the internal water scarcity of the country at hand.
Below is an analysis of the regression’s accuracy in predicting virtual water import for the
MENA region as a whole forthe year 2011. The following MENA averages from the panel data (2011)
are used in the predicted equation: population: 22.14million, GDP: 142.75 billion USD, and total
domestic water withdrawal: 16.82 billion cubic meters.
Predicted virtual water import using MENA region averages(2011) = 1.314+ 0.568 (Population) + 0.045
(GDP) + ----0.196 (Total Domestic Water Withdrawal)
Predicted virtual water import using MENA region averages (2011) = 1.314+ 0.568 (22.14) + 0.045
(142.75) +----0.196 (16.82)
Predicted virtual water import using MENA region averages (2011) = 17.01billion cubic meters
Actual average from panel dataset for MENA countries (2011) = 17.10 billion cubic meters
Forecasting
Bearing in mind some reasonable expectations for how each of these three variables might change
in upcoming years, one can make predictions for a year such as 2025. It is however difficult to make
predictions about future domestic water withdrawal given the finite nature of domestic water resources.
Despite the variable’s statistical significance in the regression analysis, it is removed from the equation
used for forecasting. While the years 2008-2011 showa total domestic water withdrawal increase of
roughly 5% annually,given scarce water resources and declining rainfall, it is highly unlikely such a trend
will continue—particularly over the course of 14 years between 2011 and 2025. While likewise it cannot
be assumed population and GDP figures grow, the growth of these variables is not restricted in the same
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way as water withdrawal as they are not linked to a finite natural resource. Thus the regression for
predicting virtual water import—relying on population and GDP growth of 3% each—stands as:
Virtual Water Import = 1.314+ 0.568 (Population) + 0.045 (GDP)
Country

Virtual Water Import: 2011

Virtual Water Import: 2025

(Billions of cubic meters)

(Billions of cubic meters)

-- Panel Dataset-Egypt

65.16

--Predicted via Regression Model
assuming 3% growth figures for
population and GDP-87.85

Syria

14.05

23.81

Qatar

1.14

14.70

Iraq

14.47

37.48

Yemen

13.04

24.92

This research acknowledges a variety of other factors at work other than population and GDP
affecting virtual water. The estimates above are raw and speculative, this said, it is fairly clear that virtual
water import in the MENA region is on the rise—some might say disproportionately so.In a water scarce
nation such as Yemen, a predicted 2025 virtual water import of 24.92 billion cubic meters for a predicted
population of 37.51million inhabitants is alarmingly high. To put the figure in perspective, the entire
country of India with a population of over a billion people: 1,053,898,107 in the year 2000 had a similar
level of total virtual water import at 23.39 billion cubic meters (Hoekstra and Mekonnen, 2011). Granted
the internal water scarcity situation in India remains different, it puts in perspective how large virtual
water import may grow to be among the most water scarce MENA countries. The Catch-22 of the
situation at large is that growth in a country’s population and GDP are generally speaking desirable. How
then do MENA countries pursue growth in these areas without pushing virtual water import to
dangerously high levels? This question is explored in the researcher’s findings section.
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Models 2-4: First Differences, Per Capita, and % Change
These three models fail to produce any significant coefficients. Furthermore, the incredibly low
r-squared results indicate the inability of the models to produce predictive regression equations.
Model 5-7: Country and Time Effect
These models simulate country and time effects via the use of 0/1 dummy variables. In all
instances: time effect, country effect, and time-country effect, the researcher observes slight changes to
the coefficients for each of the independent variables. For time effect Model 6, removal of the year 2000,
results in a slighter higher r-squared. The researcher speculates that the year 2000 does not fit the
estimated regression as well as the other years (2008-11), given the 8-year gap.
Models 8 and9: Log and Log-Linear
Model 9, the more significant of the two models, provides estimates for percentage change in
virtual water import based on unit changes to the independent variables. The model’s regression equation,
based on the variables deemed significant, can be written as follows:
Log Virtual Water Import = βo + β1 (Population) + β2 (GDP) + β3 (Total Domestic Water Withdrawal)
Log Virtual Water Import = 0.501 + 0.021 (Population) + 0.001 (GDP) + ----0.009 (Total Domestic Water
Withdrawal
The model thus estimates that 1 unit increases to each of the independent variables produces a
virtual water import increase of 1.3%. The long-term predictive capability of the model may be less
informative. To begin there is the uncertainty of domestic water withdrawal in the long-term future, as is
discussed in the Model 1 analysis. Thus, if the water withdrawal variable is removed, as its relationship is
negative, predicted virtual water import rises.
Log Virtual Water Import = 0.501 + 0.021 (Population) + 0.001 (GDP)
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1 unit increases to population and GDP thus predict a 2.2% increase to virtual water import.
Assuming population and GDP growth rates of 3% annually for the region’s countries, this model’s
prediction of future levels of virtual water import produces results different than that of Model 1. Take
Yemen as an example. Assuming population and GDP growth of 3% annually between 2011 and 2025,
the unit increases will be 12.71 and 17.31, respectively. The model thus predicts:
Log Virtual Water Import = 0.021 (12.71) + 0.001 (17.31)
Log Virtual Water Import = 0.2842
Virtual Water Import Increase = 28.42%
A 28.42% increase to Yemen’s virtual water import figure for 2011 results in a 2025 prediction
of: 16.75 billion cubic meters, substantially lower than the 24.92 estimate of Model 1. Similar log-linear
estimations for Egypt and Qatar yield results which are likewise substantially lower than those made for
the countries via Model 1.
Accuracy of the Model
Using the full model over the panel data years specifically (water withdrawal variable included),
the model’s accuracy can be tested. Yemen’s virtual water import, as is estimated in the panel data,
increases from12.77 billion cubic meters in 2010 to 13.04 billion cubic meters in 2011—a percentage
change of 2.11. The unit changes to each of its three significant variables during this period areas follows:
Population: 0.75 million, GDP: 2.72 billion, and Total Domestic Water Withdrawal: 0.033 billion. Thus:
Log Virtual Water Import = 0.021 (0.75) + 0.001 (2.72) + ----0.009 (0.033)
Log Virtual Water Import = 0.0182
Virtual Water Import Increase: 1.82%
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The predicted increase of 1.82% is lower than the actual of 2.11% but achieves relative accuracy
in matching the panel data estimations for virtual water import. Accuracy of this log-linear model in
producing results which match those seen in the panel data depends largely on the country chosen. Tests
for Egypt, as an example, do not prove informative. Egypt’s high domestic water withdrawal figures,
when multiplied by the negative coefficient (-0.009), too strongly work against the other variables in the
equation. Indeed, the accuracy of this model for Yemen may largely be due to the country’s minimal
domestic water withdrawal—increasing only 0.033 billion cubic meters from 2010 (3.73) to 2011 (3.763).
Models 10 and 11: Second Per Capita Model (w/ Renewable Water Resources) and Second Absolute
Model (w/ Year 2000 removed)
Of the independent variables for Model 10only GDP proves to be significant (0.10 level).It is
however worth noting that the coefficient for renewable water resources per capita is negative (-0.002).
While the significance level stands at an unimpressive 0.333, the negative relationship remains interesting
to the researcher. The reason for this is that it indicates the possibility of the research’s water strain theory
holding true. To recall, this research hypothesizes that domestic water strain is a potential incentive for
virtual water import. As renewable water resources per capita decline, countries become more inclined to
cover food demand via the use of external water resources. The inverse of this relationship is thus
reflected in the regression equation’s negative coefficient: as renewable water resources per capita
increase, virtual water import declines. This notion is further supported by the correlation graphing herein
(see Graph 2). In the case of Model 11, which removes the year 2000 from the regression, the results are
almost identical to those produced in the time-effect model (Model 6) as they essentially perform the
same operation. As stated, the r-squared indicates a more effective model with the year 2000 excluded.
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Correlation Graphing
The dots in all three linear graphs hereinrepresent observations for the 18 MENA countries. They
are estimations using information provided in the panel data. The y-axis in all graphs charts virtual water
import, while the x-axis depicts one of three different domestic water conditions: Graph 1-water
withdrawal, Graph 2-water scarcity, Graph 3-agricultrually induced domestic water strain.
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Graph 1—Virtual Water Import vs. Total Domestic Water Withdrawal
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Graph 1 3 indicates a positive relationship (r-squared 0.36) between the two variables. The
research question that gives basis to this graph is the following: What is the relationship between
domestic water withdrawal and virtual water import? Are the countries with higher levels of domestic
water withdrawal likely to have higher or lower levels of virtual water import? If it is the case that
countries with higher levels of domestic water withdrawal have lower levels of virtual water import, or
similarly, countries with lower levels of domestic water withdrawal have higher levels of virtual water
import, it can by hypothesized that virtual water acts as a tool to cover overall water consumption and
alleviate water withdrawal from stressed domestic resources. This being said, the graph indicates

3

Graph 1 consists of 90 data points (18 country observations over 5 years: 2000 and 2008-2011). The x-axis data:
total domestic water withdrawal is provided by FAO’s AQUASTAT database. The researcher used data from the
two most recent years given and used constant interval change to estimate the designated years. The y axis data
comes from the researcher’s self-produced virtual water estimates.
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otherwise. The positive correlation between domestic water withdrawal and virtual water import is best
explained by the overall rise of virtual water demandin the region.
The relationship is thus most like corollary and not causal. As virtual water demand increases at
large, both domestic water withdrawal and virtual water import rise to meet it. As factors in the region,
most notably robust population growth, lead to greater water consumption among all sectors, on a country
by country basis, virtual water import assists in meeting this demand. Graph 1 may indicate that overall
virtual water demand (on a country by country basis) has reached a point such that virtual water import
and domestic water withdrawal must rise together to meet it.
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Graph 2—Virtual Water Import Per Capita vs. Renewable Domestic Water Resources Per Capita
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As Graph 2 4 indicates, the relationship between virtual water import per capita and renewable
domestic water resources per capita shows a negative correlation (r-squared: 0.0.379). For countries with
higher levels of water resources per capita, virtual water import per capita tends to be lower. Thus, a
4

Graph 2 consists of 90 data points (18 country observations over 5 years: 2000 and 2008-2011). The x values for
the data points above (renewable domestic water resources per capita) are produced via data from FAO’s
AQUASTAT database. The researcher used the two most recent years provided by the database to estimate (via
constant interval change) the years 5 years designated. The y values come from the researcher’s self-produced
virtual water estimates.
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decrease in water resources per capita corresponds to higher virtual water import. The researcher posits
that this is due to the water depravity component of the virtual water import phenomenon: low levels of
available domestic water resources induce virtual water import. While this correlation graph by no means
proves such a causal relationship exists, it at the very least provides grounds to propose such a claim.
Adding to the significance of this is the fact that water resources per capita in the MENA region
are already notoriously low and declining rapidly. Per capita water share in the Arab world as a whole is
1,000 cubic meters—substantially lower than the global average of 7,000 cubic meters, and is expected to
fall to 500 cubic meters before 2025 (Dayem and Odeh, 2010, 172). Graph 2 above focuses on the MENA
region—a contingency of countries that includes the Arab world along with non-Arab countries Iran and
Israel—and estimates an average renewable domestic per capita water supply of 406 cubic meters for the
region at large. The average virtual water import per capita, based on the graph, stands at 1121 cubic
meters.
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Graph 3—Virtual Water Import Per Capita vs. Agricultural Water Withdrawal as a Percentage of
Renewable Water Resources (Agricultural Water Strain)
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Graph 3 5 reveals a positive correlation between virtual water import per capita and agricultural
water strain. It should be noted that in the case of several countries, agricultural water withdrawal exceeds
100 percent of renewable water resources, this can be explained by either extraction of water from nonrenewable aquifers or use of desalination (World Bank, 2011). The graph indicates that for the countries
whose agricultural sectors strain domestic water resources, virtual water import per capita is generally
higher. The explanation of robust population growth and rising food demand does not necessarily explain
this correlation, as virtual water import is measured on a per capita basis. In other words, in the countries
where people consume high levels of imported virtual water individually, agriculture’s strain on domestic
water resources is also likely to be higher. The logic behind this relationship may be the following. As

5

Graph 3 consists of only data for the years 2000 and 2010, thus there are substantially less data points than the other
graphs. This is due to the fact that the x-variable was not part of the regression analysis and the researcher did not
calculate values for all five years. Due to missing data, 26 of a possible 34 observations are used in the above graph
(with Saudi Arabia excluded). 3 observations cannot be seen as their percentage is beyond 600.
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countries increase stress on water resources via agricultural activity, their interest in importing
agricultural commodities rises in conjunction. The collective desire of MENA nations to import
agricultural commodities—and the virtual water which constitute them—rises as they increasingly see the
effect their own farming has on finite water resources. Virtual water import is thus a compensation
mechanism countries are more inclined to take advantage of as domestic water scarcity becomes more
desperate.
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Panel Dataset: Virtual Water Import Observations
Below is a breakdown of virtual water import for the MENA region at large over the 5 years
assessed by the researcher (2000 and 2008-2011).
Total Virtual Water Import in the MENA Region (billions of cubic meters)
2000

2008

2009

2010

2011

147.93

271.28

273.58

309.89

307.72

The researcher acknowledges the peculiarity of the decrease in overall virtual water import for the
MENA region at large between 2010 and 2011 (as is reported by the data). The reason for this is
undoubtedly limited data for the 2011, particularly in the case of Saudi Arabia. Simply put, for some of
the countries the virtual water estimation for 2011 does not include as many crops as is the case in other
years. Virtual water import for the region as a whole roughly doubles in the 11 year span assessed by the
researcher (increase of 108%).
Below is a chart highlighting averages (non-weighted) for the region over the 5 years assessed by
the researcher:
Virtual Water Import Averages for the MENA Region (billions of cubic meters)
2000

2008

2009

2010

2011

7.79

14.28

14.40

16.31

16.20

The lower average for 2011 vs. 2010 again is the result of missing data. The 16.20 billion cubic
meter average for the region in 2011—given an average population for the region of 22.14 million in
2011—is certainly high by global standards. Putting this in context of more official global water import
figures (only available for the year 2000) one can see the relative magnitude of these virtual water
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numbers. In the year 2000, Germany had a population of 82,211,508 (World Bank, 2013) and a virtual
water import of 15.76 billion cubic meters (Hoekstra and Mekonnen, 2011). Comparing Germany’s
virtual water import figure to the almost equivalent 2011 MENA region virtual water import average of
16.20 billion cubic meters with a population average of only 22,141,980, one can see the
disproportionality.
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Aggregate Virtual Water Import: Country Rankings
Billions of Cubic Meters
(5 Years: 2000 and 2008-2011)
Country

Population Rank

Egypt

Aggregate Virtual Water
Import (billions of cubic
meters)
190.03

Algeria

187.14

3

Iran

163.53

2

Morocco

113.20

4

Saudi Arabia

97.79

6

UAE

87.86

11

Syria

74.55

8

Yemen

70.17

7

Israel

65.20

10

Tunisia

61.41

9

Iraq

56.71

5

Libya

41.87

12

Jordan

34.97

13

Lebanon

24.20

14

Kuwait

19.49

16

Oman

12.32

15

Qatar

5.49

17

Bahrain

4.47

18

1
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It follows that virtual water import at large trends closely with total population due to the very
basic causal relationship at play: more people to feed equals more water to import. Nonetheless, two
countries stand out as having virtual water import figures disproportionate to their size.
•

The UAE with the region’s 11th largest population stands as the 6th largest virtual water importer.
This may be explained by the high per capita income of its citizens and the subsequent ability to
purchase large quantities of high water content food products. The GDP per capita calculations
used in the research in some sense capture this purchasing power component of virtual water
import. One notes that the UAE has the third highest GDP per capita in the region behind Kuwait
and Qatar.

•

Iraq, with the region’s 5th largest population, ranks only 11th in virtual water import. While a
reasonable explanation for this may be the Iraq War (2003-2011), it should be noted that in
2000—before the war began—Iraq ranked even lower at 11th for virtual water import in the
region. Iraq’s notably low virtual water import--given its population—might best be explained by
the country’s high amount of renewable internal water resources. In 2011, Iraq’s supply of
renewable internal water resources ranked third in the region behind those of Iran and Lebanon.
In the case of Iraq, it thus seems to be that the lack of internal water scarcity contributes to the
country’s low demand for virtual water import.
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VII. Conclusions and Findings

This section attempts to clarify how the general conclusions reached during the testing and data
analysis phases fit within the broader context of what is known regarding virtual water import. This
research’s attempt to evaluate the causal relationship between the independent variables and virtual water
import is important and challenging. Is it necessarily the case that the independent variables provided are
causing virtual water import to increase, or are they simply increasing simultaneously alongside virtual
water import, which itself is rising for reasons not charted? There are a few points worth mentioning
regarding this crucial question.
It is possible for virtual water import and a variable like GDP to rise simultaneously without
causality or even correlation existing; nonetheless, external evidence exists to support the notion that
some relationship is at play. Looking at the issue globally, one common trend in the developed world is
that numerous countries with plentiful supplies of domestic water resources still manage to have high
levels of virtual water import. Canada, France, Russia, and the United States—among numerous others—
are water endowed nations that export large quantities of virtual water yet still maintain high levels of
virtual water import (Mekkonen and Hoekstra, 2011, Appendix VI). This can be explained, at least in
part, by the fact these nations are developed economically. Americans and Europeans consume high
levels of virtual water because they desire and can afford large quantities of high water content foods. As
GDP rises in the MENA region—albeit for the better—it is nonetheless reasonable to assume residents
are will try to adopt these high water consumption habits practiced among the developed world.
The result seen in Model 10 regarding the relationship between renewable water resources and
virtual water import is interesting given the parallel shown with the graphing and panel data observations.
While the variable renewable water resources per capita cannot be measured statistically significant at any
of the three levels selected, the negative coefficient does point to a relationship hypothesized in this
research: higher levels of renewable water resources per capita work against the incentive to import
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virtual water. This idea is further confirmed by the assessment of Iraq’s peculiarly large virtual water
import, given its modest population. As noted in the data analysis section, Iraq has the MENA region’s 5th
highest population but only 11th highest virtual water import. The researcher’s explanation for this is
Iraq’s large supply of renewable domestic water resources—3rd largest in the region. In the case of Iraq, it
would appear the country minimizes virtual water import via use of its abundant internal water resources.
This said, the research still indicates that as a nation’s population and GDP rise, increase in virtual water
import is inevitable, regardless of how favorable quantities of domestic water are.

57
VIII. Practical Implications and Policy Relevance

One of the best reasons for categorizing rising virtual water import as a Catch-22 situation is that
economic development is both its cause and solution. As renewable domestic water resources cannot be
increased, only managed more efficiently, economic development is crucial to minimizing virtual water
import dependency. More effective management of renewable domestic water resources is essential in
reducing a nation’s need to import virtual water. Unfortunately, efficient water management is a daunting
task that requires good governance practices, technical capabilities, and operational capacities (Stockholm
International Water Institute, 2005, 4). Thus, the best water management is most likely to be found in the
developed world. How then do MENA countries achieve the economic development necessary to allow
them to most effectively manage their domestic water resources without incurring unrealistically high
levels of virtual water import to get there?
To begin, it is crucial MENA countries pursue efficient water management practices currently
within reach. This includes steps such as small-scale technical capacity building with farmers; activities
include rainwater harvesting, reuse of wastewater, and village level irrigation infrastructure (Ibid). In the
case of both Morocco and Jordan, modernization of irrigation methods and technology is said to be
responsible for a 70% increase in water use productivity (Abou-Hadid, 2010, 60). Moreover, governance
and legislative reforms that improve water management can occur regardless of economic development or
GDP growth. Practically speaking this can mean the reworking of water management legislation as well
as the restructuring of water management authorities such that official water rules more accurately
address reality (Ibid, 56). This can occur via a variety of means such as the creation of water use
associations as well as the general decentralization of water regulation (Ibid, 59). Finally, more efficient
water management can also take place via modification to existing farmer incentives. In the MENA
region water authorities are becoming increasingly aware of how growing water scarcity and tighter
budgets make the existing irrigation subsidies to agriculture unsustainable (Ibid, 57). This in mind,
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alternative methods for incentivizing better water management among farmers include financial tools like
tax cuts and rebates that promote the growth of low water content crops, as well as water conscious crop
growth patterns (Ibid).
The second crucial component in mitigating rising virtual water import in the MENA region is
diet. That most people in the world today remain unaware that most of the water they consume comes
from the food they eat is evidence to the fact that diet remains the lost component of global water
management. As population and purchasing power in the MENA region rise, diet will take on increasing
significance in the water scarcity discussion. From a policy perspective, there are several practical actions
governments can take to shift dietary practices in favor of lower water consumption. Financial tools such
as subsidies and rebates can be used to promote the success of low water content commodities in the food
market. Additionally, water-nutrient ratios can be included on the labels of food products as standard
information.
It is important to note that the research herein does not make the policy suggestion that virtual
water import is undesirable. As growth occurs in the region, virtual water import must rise. However, the
extent of this virtual water import increase can be minimized via successful domestic water management
and conscientious dietary practices. The graphical illustration of this concept can be found below.
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Circle 1: The circle as a whole represents total virtual water
consumption via food. The ¾ black section represents the
portion of this consumption covered by virtual water import,
the ¼ section representing the consumption of domestic
water in its virtual form.

Circle 2: As virtual water consumption increases the circle
expands. Domestic water resources remain constant, thus the
white area of Circle 1 remains the same in Circle 2, now
representing a smaller portion of overall virtual water
consumption. Virtual water import increases in quantity as
well as proportionally to compensate. A higher percentage of
virtual water consumption is now covered by import.

Circle 3: Reduction of per capita virtual water consumption via
dietary changes counteracts rising virtual water consumption.
The size of the overall circle remains the same. Virtual water
import remains unchanged; the same amount of domestic
water covers overall virtual water consumption.
Additionally, improved domestic water management has the
ability to keep the circle from expanding. As agricultural
practices achieve higher crop per drop ratios, total virtual
water consumption remains the same despite increased food
consumption.
Given the rapid rise in virtual water consumption over recent
years in the region, the researcher does not expect Circle 3 to
be achievable in practice, but it represents the positive effect
both diet and water management can have on reducing virtual
water consumption at large, and virtual water import
specifically.
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IV. Conclusion

Virtual water concept founder and largest advocate, Tony Allan, describes the significance of the
virtual water issue in the modern world by stating simply, “It can’t be reiterated enough: most of the
water you use comes through your food consumption” (Ibid, 2011, 6). Unfortunately, the impact of public
apathy towards this fact will not be distributed equally among the citizens of the world in future decades.
It’s clear that the world’s most water scarce regions are likely to bear the largest burden of increasing
global water scarcity.Future decades will see virtual water trade become increasingly characterized by
less supply and higher demand. The MENA region is therefore the geographical starting point for the
virtual water trade discussion. The dependency of the region’s countries on virtual water import is
unmatched.
While virtual water import via food commodities has sustained the region for decades, it cannot
be assumed that region will always be able to remain a beneficiary of global water trade. This in mind, the
region must prioritize how it can get more out of its domestic water resources to stave off unsustainably
high levels of virtual water import dependency. This thesis attempts to contribute to this cause by putting
forth estimates as to how much virtual water is increasing and the extent to which this increase is the
result of predictable factors such as population and GDP.

61
References

Allan, Tony. (2011). Virtual Water: Tackling the Threat to Our Planet’s Most Precious Resource. New
York: I.B. Tauris.
Barghout, Shawki. (2010). Overview. Report of the Arab Forum for Environment and Development.
Black, Maggie and King, Jannet. (2009). The Atlas of Water: Mapping the World’s Most Critical
Resource. Los Angeles: Myriad Editions.
Carus, Felicity. (2010). UN urges global move to meat and dairy-free diet. The Guardian. Retrieved from
http://www.guardian.co.uk
Chapagain A.K. and Hoekstra, A.Y. (2007). The water footprints of Morocco and the Netherlands: Global
water use as a result of domestic consumption of agricultural commodities. Ecological
Economics, Ed. 64, 143-151.
Chapagain A.K. and Orr, S. (2008). UK Water Footprint: the impact of the UK’s food and fibre
consumption on global water resources. World Wildlife Fund.
Dayem, Safwat Abdel, and Odeh, Nancy. (2010). Water Governance. Report of the Arab Forum for
Environment and Development.
FAO AQUASTAT (2012). Food and Agricultural Organization’s Information System on Agriculture:
AQUASTAT. Retrieved from http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/main/index.stm
FAO STAT. (2012). Food and Agricultural of the United Nations Statistical Division. Retrieved from
http://faostat.fao.org/site/291/default.aspx
Hadid, Abou. (2010). Agriculture Water Management. Report of the Arab Forum for Environment and
Development.
Hoekstra A.Y. and Hung P.Q. (2002). Virtual water trade: a quantitification of virtual water flows
between nations in relation to international crop trade. Value of Water Research Report Series,
vol. 11. UNESCO-IHE, Delft, The Netherlands.
Hoekstra A.Y. and Mekonnen M.M. (2011). National Water Footprint Accounts: The Green, Blue and
Grey Water Footprint of Production and Consumption. Value of Water Research Report Series,
vol. 1. UNESCO-IHE, Delft, The Netherlands.
International Trade Centre. (2012). Trade map: trade statistics for international business development.
Market Analysis and Research, International Trade Centre. Retrieved from
http://www.trademap.org/
James, John. (2013). Export oil, import water- the Middle East’s risky economics. IRIN News. Retrieved
from http://www.irinnews.org
Lockerbie, John. (2013). The Population of Qatar. Catnaps.org. Retrieved from
http://www.catnaps.org/islamic/population.html

62
Majzoub, Tarek. (2010). Water Laws. Report of the Arab Forum for Environment and Development.
Reuters. (2008). Scientist who invented virtual water wins prize. Thomsan Reuters. Retrieved from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/03/19/idUSL18502272
Stockholm International Water Institute. (2005). Let it Reign: The New Water Paradigm for Global Food
Security. Arkspressen, Vasteras.
UNESCO Press. (2012). Global water resources under increasing pressure from rapidly growing demands
and climate change, according to new UN World Water Development Report. UNESCO Media
Services. Retrieved from http://www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/single
view/news/global_water_resources/
United States’ Census Bureau. (2012). International programs. United States’ Census Bureau,
International Database. Retrieved from http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/
Water Efficiency Task Group. (2006). Virtual Water. Victorian Water Industry Association Inc.
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. (2009). Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach. South-Western Ohio,
USA: Cengage Learning.
World Bank. (2008). Dealing with Water Scarcity in MENA. The World Bank Group. Retrieved from
http://go.worldbank.org/EAENEPWXA0
World Bank. (2011). Middle East and North Africa. The World Bank Group. Retrieved from
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/
World Bank. (2013). Database. The World Bank Group.

